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Abstract
Eutrophication of aquatic ecosystems is a functional process triggered by excessive nutri-
ent inputs into water courses. It causes disruption to ecosystems, with impacts on associ-
ated goods and services, which consequently might not be provided in a sustainable 
way. These impacts have served to politicize the issue in recent years. In this chapter, we 
present the main lessons learned from an international literature review on the economic 
aspects of eutrophication, first with the purpose of managing the problem in France 
and second in the context of a European research project. This study aims to help public 
decision-making in the reduction of this water pollution. By analyzing past experiences 
and the results of recent modeling work, it allows to avoid a number of pitfalls and focus 
on efficient solutions.
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1. Introduction
Natural environments are no longer able to assimilate without harming all the pollution 
caused by human activities. Many rivers, coasts, and water bodies suffer from eutrophication 
[1, 2]. While the induced costs are difficult to estimate, they must be taken into account in 
public policies relating to agricultural and urban development. Eutrophication is triggered 
by excessive nutrient inputs, mainly nitrogen and phosphorus [3], causing increased levels of 
biomass in aquatic ecosystems. This can result in major disruption to aquatic ecosystems and 
may also impact associated goods and services, economic activities, and human health. The 
main sources of this pollution are agricultural activities, discharge from urban waste water 
treatment plants, and individual sewage treatment systems. The principal economic issues 
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are the following: What is the best way to define and implement acceptable trade-offs by 
different stakeholders? How can economic activities and eutrophication be balanced in urban 
and rural territories while respecting the principles of sustainable development in a context 
of global change?
France is one of the countries affected by this phenomenon [1]. In view of this, the French 
government asked various research centers to carry out a literature review on the nature of 
the eutrophication, its causes and consequences, and potential mitigation measures. A total 
of 4000 documents (books, peer-reviewed articles) were analyzed in early 2017. In this article, 
we present part of this work, focusing exclusively on the economic aspects of public policy 
relating to this problem. For this purpose, 932 articles were selected from the Econlit and 
Scopus databases. Only the 382 most relevant of those were selected, following a review of 
their abstracts. More recent works were added later in the context of the Collaborative Land-
Sea Integration Platform (COASTAL) research project.
In this chapter, we will focus exclusively on methodological works, using examples from case 
studies to illustrate a number of points. This will allow us to learn valuable lessons concerning 
the possible tools that could be developed for public decision-makers. In Section 2, we present 
general issues surrounding eutrophication prevention, namely, difficulty in defining a clear 
objective, difficulty in carrying out cost-benefit analyses, and the associated uncertainty and 
irreversibilities. We will also examine the consequences of combined pollution, both in terms 
of causes and effects. In Section 3, we explore possible ways of reducing pollution, followed 
by a more detailed presentation of the tools that can be used to deal with both diffuse and 
point source pollution in agricultural and domestic areas. The conclusion, in Section 4, sum-
marizes the main lessons that can be learned from this work.
2. Difficulties in combatting eutrophication
2.1. Defining objectives
First of all, objectives have to be defined: without this first stage, it is difficult to rank possible 
actions and to subsequently evaluate the efficiency of policies. As shown by Naevdal in [4], 
there is generally an optimal level of eutrophication, which is neither the search for a total 
absence of eutrophication, which would involve too great a cost for society (lack of economic 
activities, high purification of water), nor the acceptance, without seeking improvement, of 
harmful levels of eutrophication. From an economic point of view, the most effective con-
trol of a pollutant is achieved when the marginal abatement costs are equal among all those 
responsible for discharges and when these costs are equal to the marginal benefit of a better 
water quality (see also Iho et al. in [5]).
That said, in most cases, information on marginal benefits is not available, and biophysical 
sciences (e.g., natural sciences) will set emission reduction targets based on environmen-
tal motives. In this case, the problem is how to achieve (for the best price) a given level of 
total discharge (or a water quality level), which is agreed upon through political channels. 
Further complicating the picture, eutrophication is most often linked to threshold effects 
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(concentration levels for different pollutants), and once these thresholds are exceeded, eco-
system dynamics evolve, making it difficult to define optimal policies.
In this situation, as Xepapadeas observes in [6], it is better to couple ecological models and 
economic models. Such a representation makes it possible to take into account and combine 
elements such as strategic interactions between economic agents, non-convexities induced 
by nonlinear loops, different spatial and temporal scales, and the representation of different 
spatial and temporal dynamics. However, this may require the implementation of complex 
models. A new form of arbitration must then be found between the simplicity of representa-
tions and their realism. Neglecting the phenomena of bifurcation or irreversibility can thus 
lead to economically or ecologically undesirable states.
2.2. Cost-benefit analyses
Two objectives can be pursued: maximizing the net benefit of actions or minimizing costs 
with a given objective (see, e.g., Gren in [7] for a comparison of two possibilities applied to 
the Baltic Sea). Bryhn et al. insist in [8] that the costs of actions foreseen must in any case be 
compared to the expected benefits: for example, the Baltic Sea Action Plan signed in 2007 
appears to have costed € 3 billion per year. It is then important to minimize the risk of waste 
of such big sums for more or less effective measures.
However, Huppes stressed in [9] that the direct and/or indirect costs of environmental poli-
cies are quite complex to define and calculate. For the latter, for example, public authorities 
bear the costs of control, the disputes arising from them, the costs of research needed for 
effective actions, companies bearing the costs of constraints, administrative costs, litigation 
costs, etc.
Additionally, these costs generally have a dynamic aspect (variation over time) that further 
complicates decision-making. Finally, transaction costs (negotiation costs, consultation costs, 
system administration costs, decision-making costs, etc.) are often far from insignificant 
but depend on intervention by public authorities, especially for diffuse pollution (see, e.g., 
McCann and Easter in [10]).
For policies relating to the agricultural community, von Blottnitz et al. recall in [11] that the 
way in which policies are implemented also impacts agricultural employment and business 
linked to the sector, as well as income and production for farmers (see Arata et al. in [12] for 
an example of reduction of livestock).
It is also necessary to determine who will bear these direct and indirect costs: Modifying 
certain practices (conditions of the use of fertilizers in agriculture, crop rotation as studied by 
Power et al. in [13], wastewater treatment modalities) will be reflected in prices (of agricul-
tural products) and taxes (for local water purification) and may also result in a modification of 
the risks incurred (e.g., risk on the level of the agricultural income, on the quantity of produc-
tion of food products, with repercussions going beyond the prices). In cost-benefit analyzes, 
it is essential not to put more emphasis on the present costs but to take better account of the 
long-term benefits to the environment through a judicious choice of the discount rate that 
must also incorporate uncertainties (see Ludwig et al. in [14]).
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As regards the benefit side, the task is not easy either. For example, the assessment of the 
environmental or social benefits linked to less eutrophication are the subject of numerous 
papers (see [1]); but due to a lack of space, we cannot develop this aspect here.
The challenge is to find a method to fight eutrophication that is either incentivizing or binding 
and which will result in an acceptable balance for all parties (farmers, taxpayers, those benefit-
ing from water quality, etc.), while taking into account the constraints that apply to everybody 
(agricultural markets fluctuating, overall tax burden compared to other countries, etc.).
2.3. Uncertainties, irreversibility, and robustness of solutions
The results of the various studies are generally derived from models or reasoning subject to 
numerous uncertainties. Some uncertainties affecting decision-making are described by Singh 
et al. in [15]: it may take the form of the impossibility of defining a single probability distribution 
for the most important parameters for the underlying model or to have a single well-defined 
objective to capture the simultaneous and divergent interests of the main stakeholders. This 
was already highlighted by Wladis et al. in [16], although it is often ignored by decision-makers.
Turner et al. in [17] also emphasize this fact in a context of scientific uncertainty. One manage-
ment objective may be to maintain a certain stability of the environment, with parameters 
remaining within certain limits.
Lempert and Collins in [18] work in a completely different context, which involves making a 
decision in uncertainty when the links between actions and their consequences are relatively 
unknown. No attempt is made to seek the optimality of the solution in the context of the 
assumptions made and of the supposed value of the parameters. The objective is to have a 
solution that may be less efficient but more robust, namely, less sensitive to assumptions and 
satisfactory for a relatively wide range of future parameters and conditions, while keeping 
some options open.
Another difficulty is how to take into account fluctuations in pollutant emissions over time 
and not just take into consideration average values. This can lead to the simultaneous intro-
duction of a number of different instruments, each pursuing a certain goal (reduction of aver-
age pollution, peak pollution).
An adaptive management model is described by Bond and Loomis in [19], where agents use 
small-scale experiments to test assumptions about global system responses. It is therefore 
necessary to arbitrate between collecting information and managing the system to achieve 
the objective (e.g., to move toward an optimal level of pollution). Agents can thus voluntarily 
deviate from the optimum trajectory for this purpose. Generally, it is understood that this 
method leads to better and more informed decisions when there are significant uncertainties.
It was within this framework that Ludwig et al. in [20] implemented a profit optimization 
model related to agricultural activities minus the costs associated with the eutrophication of a 
downstream lake. They show that the interaction of slow and fast variables can create resilient 
or vulnerable systems. To manage such a system, the solution may be to monitor appropriate 
slow variables and take action before it is too late. An approach based on quasi-option values 
(see Henry in [21]) would lead to a reduction in pollutants so as to remain below this possible 
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limit that would induce a changeover. This is the case here with the potentially slow dynam-
ics of phosphorus in sediments.
2.4. Cross aspects of pollutions
There are many sources of eutrophication, and these sources may interact or have cross 
impacts. Gren et al. show in [22] how simultaneously taking into account nitrogen and phos-
phorus to control pollution in the Baltic Sea reduces the overall cost of abatement by about 
15% compared to a separate approach.
Kuosmanen and Laukkanen recall in [23] that reducing pollution requires a compromise 
between the reductions of these different pollutants. For example, the Helsinki Convention 
set 50% reduction targets for nitrate and phosphate emissions to combat eutrophication in the 
Baltic Sea. From an economic point of view, there is no reason to expect such uniform rates to 
produce a socially optimal reduction.
Given a source of pollution, its effects can take different forms, and it is preferable to take all 
of them into account in calculations. For example, von Blottnitz et al. indicate in [11] that the 
effects of the use of nitrogen fertilizers are climate change due to the production of these fertil-
izers, other pollutants emitted into the atmosphere during this production, the greenhouse 
effect induced by the application of fertilizers, eutrophication, drinking water pollution, and 
damage due to the emission of volatile substances (especially NH3) from these fertilizers.
In addition, Brink et al. describe in [24] how emissions of one pollutant may have impacts 
(positive or negative) on emissions of other pollutants. Some of them have local effects (e.g., 
on the eutrophication of rivers), while others have only an overall effect (greenhouse gases). 
These indirect effects, as well as their local or global nature, are most often ignored by deci-
sion-makers, whereas taking them into account would reduce the total cost of environmental 
protection, for a given objective.
3. Means to reduce water pollution
3.1. Different tools
Different instruments can be used to reduce water pollution: generally they will consist 
in incentives, regulations, physical facilities (e.g., buffer zones), or a combination of these. 
Within the framework of a “command and control” system, the regulator indicates the tech-
nical measures that should be taken and verifies that they are effective. For example, differ-
ent types of standards can be related to agricultural inputs or individual treatment systems. 
Several problems emerge, all more or less linked to the information that the regulator has on 
the effectiveness of the measures imposed, the reality of their implementation, the diversity 
of local situations, and their impact on that effectiveness.
Latacz-Lohman and Hodge showed in [25] how the first generation of European agri-envi-
ronmental measures have used this method, for example, with dates and concentrations of 
livestock manure application on agricultural land, while more recently market instruments 
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have been put in place. However, as early as 1998, Cowan insisted in [26] that economic 
instruments, such as those presented later in this chapter, generally have a better potential in 
terms of cost-effectiveness than command and control methods.
Setting taxes and subsidies is less prescriptive, since the economic agent can refuse the sub-
sidy or agree to pay the tax and continue as before. It provides incentives for the implementa-
tion of environment-friendly measures or discourages certain actions. In the case of subsidies, 
or payments for environmental services such as those described by Ma et al. in [27], arises the 
question of the financing capacities, and of “who bears the costs in the end”.
In addition, a general problem emerges: Is it legitimate to finance the reduction of pollution, 
and is it not contrary to the polluter-pays principle? One possibility is to require the polluter 
to satisfy certain constraints in order to receive subsidies for other objectives (e.g., different 
agricultural subsidies). This is not a question of funding pollution reduction, but of making it 
a prerequisite for public aid.
One of the problems generally observed is that these constraints, whose costs to public author-
ities seem to be low, are often not very targeted or too general in their definition, making them 
largely ineffective. On the other hand, a certain inequity is created between the beneficiaries 
of the subsidies, since the cost for satisfying the constraints is not always proportional to the 
amount perceived.
For sites of specific interest, for example, of great environmental value, it is possible not to 
pay the owner for the opportunities foregone in protecting the environment, but to make 
reprehensible the actions harmful for the environment. In other words, the right to property 
is now accompanied by a duty to protect the natural environment in which that property is 
located (see Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge in [25]), and payments are made only for positive 
actions in favor of the environment.
As Romstad points out in [28], these subsidies can also be used to set up buffer zones or to 
protect wetlands, thus benefitting biodiversity and landscapes and lending less weight to the 
impression that polluters are subsidized. As for the establishment of wetlands, Byström et al. 
show in [29], theoretically and with an application in southwestern Sweden, that because the 
source of pollution is random (seasonal and annual variations), the efficiency of the wetlands 
is then also random.
In a very different region such as the Mississippi Basin, Roley et al. study and compare in [30] 
the cost and effectiveness of different measures such as wetlands, intermediate crops, and 
ditches in reducing nitrogen leakage. It must be noted that the combination of these various 
means is quite possible. As regards the parameterization of such actions, the system may 
evolve gradually as direct and indirect effects are observed, as available techniques evolve, 
and as the level of general pollution develops.
These subsidies, along with taxes, can be applied to inputs such as fertilizers used, and in this 
case, they are often easier to set up (because of lower transaction costs). The main problem 
comes from the fact that what is harmful is the pollutant, whereas what is taxed or subsidized 
is an input, and between the two, there is a whole process of transformation, which can differ 
from one agent to another. In addition, the impacts of pollutants can be very different from 
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one geographical location to another. It is quite understandable (see, e.g., Taylor et al. [31]) 
that there is no single optimum instrument for all farms and that the choice of an instrument 
remains largely dependent on resource conditions and production potentials that impact the 
costs of reducing pollution. Finally, in the agricultural sector, for example, inputs may differ 
from one farm to another: the use of chemical fertilizers will be taxed, while the use of fertil-
izers produced by the animals of the farm will not. Sometimes, it is useful to differentiate 
measures according to the activities or circumstances in which pollution is generated.
Tradable permits are another option, namely, permits to emit a pollutant that can be sold or 
bought on a market. These permits are either issued free of charge or initially sold by public 
authorities (entailing an additional cost for involved stakeholders). Von Blottnitz et al. outline 
in [11] the properties of this type of instrument. Gren and Elofssen present in [32] differ-
ent variants, their potential interests, by applying these instruments to their case study (the 
Baltic Sea). This instrument is more flexible than a command and control system and does 
not require a lot of information about the polluter. With permits, pollution is immediately 
reduced, although the level needed for pollution reduction is initially unknown. But if the 
price of permits on the market is to be equal to the marginal cost of pollution reduction, the 
regulator should regularly adjust the quantity of permits issued until a socially acceptable 
situation is achieved. Similarly, Mitchell describes in [33] a system of permits for spreading 
poultry manure in the Illinois Basin.
It should be noted that spatial heterogeneity has important effects on the level of benefits that 
can result from the exchange of permits to pollute, and this dimension must be taken into 
account in implementing such a system (see Lankovski et al. in [34]).
In addition, Akao and Managi show in [35] the importance of taking into account inter-tem-
poral aspects in order to have an efficient system. A free-rider phenomenon (i.e., some people 
benefit from the effort of others) can arise at different scales: at the macroeconomic level, for 
example, around the Baltic Sea, some countries may expect their neighbors to make the first 
efforts, thus diluting the overall impact of pollution. The same effect applies at the local level 
for activities or people within the same watershed.
3.2. Toolkits for diffuse pollution
3.2.1. General information
Nonpoint source pollution is defined by the fact that the emissions of each agent are not 
directly observable at a reasonable cost. Xepapadeas describes in [36] three possible meth-
ods for reducing domestic and agricultural diffuse pollution, which are difficult to regulate 
due to information asymmetry between the polluter (who understands the effort needed to 
reduce effluents and the associated costs) and the regulator (who does not know them) and 
the random aspects between the polluter’s actions (e.g., manure spreading) and the pollution 
measured in downstream watercourses:
• The first is to consider that pollution is a function of certain production factors (inputs) and 
the developed instrument is a system of taxes, sometimes subsidies, to reduce these inputs. 
Rougoor recalls in [37] that the interest of a tax comes from the ease of implementing and the 
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associated transaction costs that are generally low. Negative aspects come from the absence 
of targeting in the case of problems restricted to a local area, where the scope of application 
of the tax does not correspond to that of pollutant emitting and more generally to the risk of 
a competitiveness decrease of the agricultural sector since production costs increase.
• The second is to observe pollution, for example, downstream (at the outlet) of a small 
watershed, to set an acceptable threshold, and to implement an ambient tax, or a global 
fine paid by all potential polluters irrespective of actual pollution, when it cross the defined 
limit; a subsidy may also be awarded where the measure gives a result below the threshold. 
Compared to a more systematic method of taxation, the first aim is to have a more efficient 
action because it is adapted to a more accurate geographical area and, on the other hand, 
to introduce collective responsibility of the farmers or inhabitants concerned. Conditional 
voluntary contracts can thus be set up, giving that way interest to everyone to respect the 
contract (e.g., reduction of pollution against subsidies).
• The third is to establish, where it is feasible and cost-effective, a system to control indi-
vidual pollution and to tax any inappropriate behavior or excessive pollution. This means 
transforming nonpoint source pollution to point source pollution, which is already the 
case, for example, for the control of individual septic tanks. It is also possible to allow the 
polluter to demonstrate the true level of effort he is willing to contribute by choosing from 
a set of possible contracts or subsidies, the most suitable one for him.
Each option has advantages and disadvantages: for example, measuring inputs can cause 
excessive information costs in addition to other costs to reduce pollution but is anyway 
fairer than ambient tax. The latter are an easy way for the regulator to move the problem 
to a lower geographical level, relying on social control that is more possible within a 
smaller group. This system of collective punishment remains however particularly unfair 
and thus may be unacceptable. For this reason, when the third possibility is reasonably 
possible, it is generally preferred. Otherwise, measurement of inputs, if not too expensive, 
is a good second choice.
3.2.2. Nonpoint source agricultural pollutions
Agriculture is often an important source of nonpoint source pollution that because of its char-
acteristics should be tackled in a particular way. Generally, solving diffuse agricultural pollu-
tion problems cannot rely on any one single solution: Pretty recalls in [38] that agriculture is, by 
definition, multifunctional (in the sense that it produces different goods together) and possibly 
the source of different negative externalities but also positive ones (landscapes, carbon seques-
tration, limitation of floods, etc.). The variety of situations and problems to be solved leads 
to various deftly articulated solutions to encourage certain practices and to dissuade others, 
ranging from advice to regulatory or legal measures, and to the use of various economic instru-
ments. As Saysel shows in [39], it is sometimes simply a matter of giving regular and relevant 
information to agents, for example, on the judicious use of fertilizers depending on the situa-
tion. For farmers, financial variables (notably income) are the main basis on which measures 
are adopted or refused. On the other hand, those located in the most at-risk areas for eutrophi-
cation are not necessarily the most likely to adopt them. Grammatikopoulou et al. in [40] have 
shown for Finland that it is more efficient to implement targeted measure, e.g., for farmers who 
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are the most able to reduce their emissions, although the cost of implementation is therefore 
much higher. Fezzi et al. worked in [41] on the costs for farmers of different measures to reduce 
eutrophication: They show, on a case study of watershed in England, the impact of the choice 
of a measure, especially the variability of this impact from one farm to another. In parallel, they 
recall the importance of the heterogeneity of soils and agricultural practices on the effects of 
such measures, as did Konrad et al. in [42] for the Odense Fjord in Denmark.
In the case of the Baltic Sea, Turner et al. [43] show that if the reduction of inputs is the most 
effective measure, uniformity of reduction measures is not optimal because of different situ-
ations between basins.
It is therefore important to think carefully as much about the local application modalities as 
the choice of an instrument. Konrad et al. use in [43] a spatialized agro-economic model to 
estimate the effect of different measures (Fjord Odense watershed) and show in particular 
that geographically targeted measures can lead to high transaction costs, in comparison with 
uniform measures, if only to define and then monitor their implementation. Xu et al. show in 
[44] how a well-chosen land use change, and modified agricultural management strategies, 
may lead to an efficient phosphorus emission reduction.
Three types of incentives for preserving permanent grasslands or converting cultivated land 
into wetlands on the west coast of Sweden are compared by Gren in [45]: a lump sum pay-
ment for the areas concerned, a set of contracts from which the farmer will choose the most 
attractive for him (thus revealing information about his costs of preservation or conversion), 
or finally a mutual agreement negotiation that is generally eliminated because it is too time 
consuming. The choice between the two first possibilities depends on the form of the cost and 
benefit functions of the farm.
The use of nitrogen fertilizers is studied in [46] by Williamson in the United States. He 
reminds us that their use depends on the price of fertilizers, the cost of agricultural products, 
and the way in which farmers manage risks, along with their knowledge of the real need of 
crops for fertilizers. Hansen and Hansen develop in [47] an interesting method for control-
ling eutrophication induced by phosphorus pollution: rather than simply taxing phosphorus 
inputs, they suggest taxing the difference between imports of inputs and exports in the form 
of agricultural products. Although their model does not take into account hazards, it provides 
an interesting perspective, especially since it includes storage of phosphorus in soil.
A system of nonlinear taxation and subsidies for reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollu-
tion is described in [48] by Bontems et al. Farmers differ according to dimensions such as com-
mon knowledge (knowledge shared by a group of agents, in which everyone knows that they 
all share it), spreading areas, level of production, or private knowledge on the way to limit 
pollution for equal production. In this framework, the authors look for ways to compensate 
farmers who implement costly practices but lead to pollution reduction; a system of payments 
revealing private information on each farmer efficiency makes it possible to improve the effort 
distribution between farms to reduce pollution.
The payment of subsidies for the adoption of measures to reduce pollution may also be con-
ditional on the outcomes. In that respect, Talberth shows in [49] that payment for grass strips 
under condition of performance is superior, in the sense that it allows to obtain a better reduc-
tion of nutrients for the same budget allocation.
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It is also important to avoid falling victim to deadweight effects, with high-cost measures 
and questionable effectiveness. This is mentioned by Dupraz et al. [50], who note that there 
is often an advantage to be gleaned from putting in place measures aimed at avoiding limit 
effects, e.g., applying to a minimum proportion of the farm’s surface area or a minimum of 
intensity. Their model shows that this risk is increased by the information asymmetry that 
exists between regulators and farmers.
Changes in plowing practices are much more difficult to encourage, as shown in [51] by 
Orderud and Vogt in a study on an area southeast of Oslo, Norway. For the authors, the solu-
tion is to increase farmers’ knowledge on the environmental issues and on the phosphorus 
cycle so that farmers could understand the complexity of the process and not be discouraged 
by immediate inconclusive results.
Kling presents in [52] an agro-economic model linking land use and resulting nitrate and 
phosphate pollution. The model is applied on two watersheds feeding the Mississippi River 
(USA) and makes it possible to test the effects of intermediate crops aiming at reducing eutro-
phication. He stresses the advantage of linking this type of model with a representation of 
farmers’ behavior.
Establishing drinking water catchment areas with farming constraints that are compulsory 
and not financially compensated, and other areas where proposed measures are voluntary 
and financially compensated, is an option examined in [53] by Osborn and Cook, with a case 
study in the island of Thanet in the Northeastern part of Kent (UK). The authors address the 
issue of scale when defining zones: it should be not too coarse, so as not to unnecessarily 
penalize agriculture, and not too refined, for example, only around drinking water catchments 
for effectiveness purposes. Similarly, Balana et al. in [54], using an environmental, agronomic, 
and economic model applied to an agricultural area in eastern Scotland, determine the costs 
and effectiveness of implementing buffer zones along watercourses. They show, on the one 
hand, that for the same effectiveness in terms of phosphorus reduction, induced costs can be 
reduced by about 20% just by varying the width of these zones, rather than imposing buffer 
zones of a uniform width. They show that costs increase exponentially as a function of the 
amount of nitrate withdrawn.
3.2.3. Domestic diffuse pollution
Withers et al., working on five case studies in Europe (England, Ireland (two cases), Scotland, 
Norway), show in [55] that the number of individual treatment systems for domestic waste-
water such as septic tanks is generally undervalued, which in turn makes other potential 
sources of eutrophication, in particular agriculture, responsible for the pollution observed.
Beyond the number, the performance of this type of treatment system is difficult to assess, 
because of a lack of information on their technical characteristics (implantation, age, level 
of maintenance, proximity to a watercourse, etc.). Although these systems often represent 
a small part of the nutrient load (mostly less than 10% on annual average in case studies), 
they can provide significant concentrations during certain periods, particularly in summer, 
and periods of low water. Increased owners’ awareness of the need to properly maintain 
their sewage treatment facilities can be a fairly effective and inexpensive way to substantially 
improve the situation.
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Motivations of Swedish owners for changing their individual treatment facilities, for achiev-
ing a better sewage treatment in order to reduce eutrophication, are examined in [56] by 
Wallin et al. Owners are motivated more by broader benefits (e.g., an improved functioning 
of their treatment system) and by fairness relative vis-à-vis other owners (that should not be 
exempted from the same changes), than by environmental concerns. In this context, economic 
incentives should work, while increased inspections would contribute to a sense of equity in 
addition to communication means on the merits of such changes.
3.3. Tools for point source pollution
Domestic, agricultural, or industrial sewage treatment plants are the main sources of point 
source water pollution, defined by the fact that the emissions of pollutants into the environ-
ment come from an identifiable source. Therefore regulations and incentives are generally 
easier to implement than in the case of diffuse pollution.
Moreover, wastewater can be reused for agriculture or green areas, in compliance with cur-
rent water quality regulations. In this context, Verlicchi et al. provide in [57] a cost-benefit 
analysis of the implementation of a post-treatment zone of sewage by planted filters for the 
city of Ferrara (Italy). Overall, the result of the cost-benefit analysis is positive, despite the use 
of a discount rate of 5%. It is particularly interesting from an environmental point of view, 
by reducing the effluent discharged into the watercourse, and also at the urban level by the 
creation of recreational spaces.
With respect to wastewater treatment, Piao et al. compare in [58] different ways of treating 
sludge from sewage treatment plants and their indirect effects on eutrophication but also 
on their potential for global warming, toxicity to humans, and acidification of the natural 
environment. The incineration of sludge, with ultimate waste treatment, seems to be the best 
method for these four dimensions.
3.4. Practical conditions for implementation of measures
In most cases, implementing measures is not straightforward because of the different stake-
holders involved and the various sources of pollution. Löwgren describes in [59] a process of 
stakeholder consultation, as called for by the European Union, in the form of two meetings of 
1 day, each with a few dozen people, on measures to be taken to combat eutrophication in a 
watershed in Sweden. The author indicates that the results obtained are not representative in 
any statistical sense. Farmers are commonly referred to as the guilty party in cases of eutrophi-
cation, and they tend to defend themselves by drawing attention to shared responsibility with 
other professionals. While it is relatively easy to identify the impacts of agriculture, it is much 
more difficult to assess their benefits: food production, support for certain types of biodiversity, 
cultural heritage, and open spaces are often seen as given, and farmers no longer draw credit 
from these externalities either in monetary terms or even in the context of this kind of reflection.
However while cooperation between residents, businesses, and farmers is particularly impor-
tant in order to combat eutrophication, Iwasa et al. show in [60] from a general model that 
this can lead to complicated dynamics in the natural environment. This is because the willing-
ness of each stakeholder to cooperate depends on the cooperation of others, as well as on the 
overall environmental concerns of society. In the model, two factors will affect the decision of 
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each agent: the cost of action for the environment and social pressure. For a lake, social pres-
sure will generally increase with the level of pollution. In total, there are different positive or 
negative return forces, involving potentially varied dynamics.
Should then decisions be decentralized? Elofsson, working on pollution in the Baltic Sea, 
recalls in [61] that regional agencies managing water in a basin generally have a more detailed 
knowledge of local conditions than structures operating at a wider geographical scale, such 
as the European Union for this case study. It would therefore be interesting to decentralize 
decisions when assessing the means of reducing eutrophication. On the other hand, there is 
a risk that regional agencies will act according to their own interests rather than those of the 
higher-level structure. The model developed actually shows, for the case of the Baltic Sea 
study, that this effect is not particularly marked.
On this basis, what is the best way to decentralize? Kroiss examines in [62] various empirical 
strategies for protecting the Danube Basin and shows that much of the technical problems of 
water protection can be solved through national, regional, or local initiatives.
He mainly distinguishes two possible approaches: definition of an environmental standard 
or a precautionary method. The environmental standard indicates a minimum level of water 
quality, which must be satisfied everywhere, and the effectiveness of each treatment is thereby 
deduced, in particular from the dilution capacities of the natural environment. For the pre-
cautionary method, a minimum reduction in pollution or effluent quality must be achieved, 
regardless of the quality of the watercourse or its dilution or retention capacity.
Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages (the precautionary approach being 
preferable for international problems, since the definition of environmental standards is more 
suited to the management of national basins or where the administration of a basin is centralized). 
In practice a combination of both would seem preferable. In fact, for the Danube, the main prob-
lem is not the translation of these methods in the texts but their actual implementation in practice.
4. Conclusion: lessons to be learnt from past experiences
In defining policies to combat eutrophication, the objective should be defined by models that 
simultaneously combine biophysical and economic aspects, and not by setting objectives for 
the state of the system, and then trying to minimize the costs of actions to be carried out. 
Other approaches can be taken, such as attempting to improve the current situation (e.g., Lake 
Apopka in Florida described by Fonyo and Boggess in [63]). For the economy, benefits must 
be compared to costs, whatever the tools used for the implementation of public decisions: 
command and control, regulation from taxes and subsidies, taxes depending on the results 
obtained locally (“ambient taxes”), and emission permits distributed free of charge or sold in 
auction. Uniform measures, such as a percentage reduction of emissions, are generally inef-
ficient, and free-rider behavior is to be expected among some stakeholders.
Five main factors of the problem are often underestimated, as shown above or in practical 
examples described in the literature but which we do not have the place to present here:
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1. The temporal dimension, with irreversibility in particular that may arise when crossing 
certain limits (e.g., a concentration level of a pollutant). This phenomenon can be taken 
into account with an appropriate representation of the systems.
2. Pollution often has several causes, and the choice to fight against one or several of them 
simultaneously or alternatively is far from being neutral on economic results. This is true 
both for the choice to take action against nitrogen and/or phosphorus in agriculture and 
to act preferentially or simultaneously on the domestic or agricultural sector or even to 
arbitrate between diffuse pollution and point source pollution.
3. Pollutions are often multiple (eutrophication, greenhouse effect, etc.), and efficiencies 
can be gained by taking that into account. Conversely, by taking into consideration the 
multiple benefits of reducing pollution, it is possible to consider alternatives that would 
otherwise be unprofitable.
4. The random nature of emissions modifies their effects in terms of eutrophication and may 
lead to the simultaneous introduction of different instruments. Furthermore, in this case, 
it may be preferable to seek certain robustness for these solutions, rather than optimality 
in one direction or the other. There will always be uncertainties, particularly those related 
to an imperfect knowledge of biophysical phenomena. It is not possible to wait until eve-
rything is known before acting. Adaptive management (by updating objectives, tools, or 
parameters, through experiments) can be a solution in this context.
5. The heterogeneous nature of sources, of the agents concerned, etc. cannot be neglected.
On the whole, it is not conceivable to copy a solution that has proved its worth in one context 
to solve another problem. On the other hand, lessons can be learned from successes or failures 
in very different situations. Ecological engineering solutions, apart from the development 
of buffer zones and wetlands, can have quite risky indirect effects. Sometimes, the question 
should be asked as to the comparative advantages of modest measures across large geograph-
ical areas or more substantial ones in smaller areas.
Finally, it should be noted that throughout this bibliographical analysis, the absence of ideal 
solutions and the interest of targeted policies designed for particular situations were high-
lighted. It is often case-driven instruments that can help to solve problems if they have been 
first properly identified and analyzed and if the solutions under consideration have been 
assessed in their different implications.
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